In 1974, the United States’ foreign policy toward the Soviet Union was guided by the policy of détente—a deliberate effort to ease Cold War tensions through diplomacy, negotiation, and limited cooperation. Initiated under President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, détente sought to stabilize the volatile superpower relationship that had dominated international politics since the end of World War II. Despite the growing domestic turmoil surrounding the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s eventual resignation, the policy remained the cornerstone of American strategy toward the Soviet Union throughout 1974.
At the heart of détente was the desire to prevent direct military confrontation and to slow the nuclear arms race that had defined the previous two decades. The Nixon administration had already taken significant steps toward arms control with the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) in 1972, which imposed restrictions on the production of certain nuclear weapons. In 1974, efforts continued to lay the groundwork for a follow-up agreement, SALT II, which would later be finalized under President Jimmy Carter. The United States viewed these negotiations as essential to maintaining global stability and preventing nuclear escalation.
A major event reflecting this ongoing diplomatic approach was the Nixon–Brezhnev Summit, held in Moscow from June to July 1974. Despite the shadow of Watergate, President Nixon traveled to meet Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev for the third time, signaling America’s continued commitment to détente. The summit resulted in several agreements, including new discussions on arms control, scientific and technological exchanges, and cooperation in space exploration. These talks also advanced preparations for the 1975 Apollo–Soyuz Test Project, a symbolic mission that represented a temporary thaw in the superpower rivalry.
However, détente was far from universally popular in the United States. By 1974, criticism was mounting among lawmakers and segments of the public who believed that the Soviet Union was taking advantage of improved relations to expand its influence abroad, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. This tension became evident in Congress through the Jackson–Vanik Amendment, which tied U.S. trade benefits to the Soviet Union’s human rights record, especially its restrictions on Jewish emigration. This marked a growing struggle between the Nixon administration’s realpolitik—pragmatic diplomacy aimed at maintaining peace—and a rising American concern for moral and humanitarian issues in foreign policy.
Following Nixon’s resignation in August 1974, President Gerald Ford inherited détente but faced increasing pressure to redefine it. While Ford continued to support arms control and dialogue with Moscow, he also adopted a more cautious stance, emphasizing reciprocity and the need for Soviet compliance with agreements. The balance between engagement and deterrence became the hallmark of America’s Soviet policy in the final months of 1974.
In summary, America’s foreign policy toward the Soviet Union in 1974 reflected both continuity and tension. Détente remained the guiding principle, symbolized by continued summits and negotiations, yet it was increasingly challenged by domestic politics, human rights concerns, and global competition. The year 1974 thus represented a pivotal moment—one in which the promise of peaceful coexistence was tested by the realities of Cold War rivalry.
Here is a discussion, an episode from a multi-part series produced by National Public Radio in 1974 on our Foreign Policy in the 1970s, featuring Zbigniew Brzezinski and Richard Pearl.
