
ABC Radio National – Late Night Live with Philip Adams – November 15, 2012
Based on the November 15, 2012, leadership transition and the discussion surrounding China’s future on ABC Radio National’s Late Night Live with Philip Adams.
November 15, 2012, marked the beginning of a new chapter in modern Chinese history. After a decade under President Hu Jintao, the Chinese Communist Party announced its new leadership, with Xi Jinping assuming the position of General Secretary. He would formally become President in March 2013. At 59, Xi represented a generation of leaders who had grown up during the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution but had subsequently experienced China’s extraordinary economic transformation.
There was considerable anticipation surrounding his arrival. China had become an economic powerhouse, its cities were expanding at extraordinary speed, a new middle class was emerging, and millions of people had experienced a dramatic improvement in their material circumstances. Yet beneath the prosperity were growing frustrations: corruption, widening inequality, environmental degradation, land seizures, and a political establishment increasingly disconnected from ordinary citizens.
Xi seemed to understand that something needed to change.
In his first address as party leader, he spoke unusually candidly about corruption, bribery, bureaucratic arrogance and officials who had lost touch with the population. He also talked about what ordinary Chinese people wanted: better education, stable employment, improved healthcare, social security and more comfortable living conditions. His language suggested a leader who understood that economic growth alone would not guarantee the continued confidence of the Chinese people. ABC listen+1
What were ordinary Chinese people expecting?
The reaction on the street was complicated. There was no single Chinese public opinion, particularly in a country where political discussion was carefully monitored. But there was widespread recognition that the country was changing faster than its political institutions.
For many urban Chinese, the immediate concerns were practical. Housing had become increasingly expensive, corruption was visible in everyday dealings with officials, and the privileges enjoyed by the children of wealthy party members were a source of considerable resentment. The emergence of the so-called fuerdai, the children of China’s newly wealthy, and the political princelings, offspring of influential party families, had become particularly contentious.
Social media provided an increasingly important outlet for these frustrations. People were questioning why some families enjoyed extraordinary privilege while others struggled to obtain adequate compensation for land taken for development or to secure affordable housing.
Xi’s early statements appeared to acknowledge those concerns. There was hope that his administration might tackle corruption, redistribute some of the benefits of economic growth and introduce greater transparency. There were also expectations of economic reform and a more responsive government.
However, even in November 2012, there were warning signs. The Politburo Standing Committee selected alongside Xi was notably conservative. Prominent advocates of greater transparency and political openness had been excluded. The possibility of substantial political liberalisation was already looking uncertain. The Guardian+1
The Xi Jinping who emerged
The man who eventually emerged was considerably different from the figure many observers thought they were getting in 2012.
Xi launched an enormous anti-corruption campaign, initially welcomed by many Chinese citizens. Thousands of officials, including powerful party figures, were investigated and punished. The campaign reached both senior officials, the so-called tigers, and lower-ranking bureaucrats, the flies.
But it also consolidated Xi’s personal authority and weakened potential political rivals.
In 2018, China removed presidential term limits, allowing Xi to remain in office beyond the traditional two-term arrangement. By 2022, he had secured an unprecedented third term as party leader, while the principle of collective leadership that had characterized the post-Mao era had been substantially weakened.
The transformation extended beyond politics. Government oversight of businesses increased, independent civil society faced tighter restrictions, media freedoms contracted and internet censorship became more sophisticated. Xi’s vision of national rejuvenation, frequently described as the Chinese Dream, placed national strength, party discipline and China’s international standing at the centre of government policy. CFR Education+1
China in 2026: A different country, a different world
Fourteen years later, China is vastly more technologically sophisticated, economically influential and internationally assertive than it was when Xi took power.
It is a world leader in electric vehicles, battery production, renewable energy and several areas of advanced manufacturing. Its infrastructure, transportation networks and technological capabilities have transformed everyday life for millions.
But the economic picture is less straightforward. Property-market difficulties, demographic decline, youth employment pressures and slower economic growth have created new uncertainties. The promise that prosperity would continually improve living standards has become more complicated.
Politically, the contrast is even sharper. Xi is now the dominant figure in Chinese government, party and military affairs. His leadership is increasingly associated with centralised authority, ideological discipline and national security. Recent purges within the military and senior party establishment illustrate just how important personal loyalty has become.
In November 2026, questions about the future of the leadership are already emerging ahead of the 2027 Communist Party Congress, with Xi widely expected to seek another term. Brookings+2
Has the world changed for the better?
That depends considerably on where one stands.
For China, the material transformation has been extraordinary. Millions have escaped poverty, infrastructure has improved, technological innovation has accelerated, and the country has acquired an international influence unimaginable to earlier generations.
But the political expectations of 2012 have largely gone unfulfilled. The anticipated opening of Chinese society has given way to tighter controls. The expectation of a more consultative leadership has been replaced by an increasingly personalised political system.
And the world around China has changed just as dramatically. In 2012, globalisation was still widely regarded as an engine of economic integration. The United States and China were deeply interconnected trading partners, and there was considerable optimism that economic cooperation would encourage political moderation.
By 2026, that optimism has largely disappeared. Strategic competition, trade restrictions, technological rivalry and tensions over Taiwan have reshaped international relations.
Perhaps the greatest irony of the November 2012 transition is that Xi Jinping arrived speaking about the need to reconnect the Communist Party with its people. He recognised the dangers of corruption, privilege and bureaucratic isolation. Yet the system he subsequently constructed has concentrated more authority in fewer hands than at any time since Mao.
China did change. It became richer, more powerful and technologically advanced. But whether it became a more open, equitable or secure society is another question entirely.
The China that people were anticipating in November 2012 was a country preparing to embrace the future. The China of November 2026 is a country that has embraced enormous change while becoming considerably more guarded about the direction in which that change should lead.
And that may be the most important distinction between the two eras.
Assistant Editors Note: One particularly useful historical contrast for the Past Daily presentation is Xi’s inaugural language about listening to ordinary people, set against the degree of political centralisation that followed. It gives the November 2012 broadcast a significance that might not have been apparent to listeners at the time.
Here is that broadcast as it was heard on November 15, 2012

Share this:
- Share on Facebook (Opens in new window) Facebook
- Share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window) LinkedIn
- Share on Tumblr (Opens in new window) Tumblr
- Share on Mastodon (Opens in new window) Mastodon
- Share on Threads (Opens in new window) Threads
- Share on Bluesky (Opens in new window) Bluesky
- Share on X (Opens in new window) X
- More