– October 12, 1973 – Secretary Of State Henry Kissinger – News Conference – Gordon Skene Sound Collection –
The Yom Kippur War, also known as the Ramadan War, the October War, the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, or the Fourth Arab–Israeli War, was an armed conflict fought from 6 to 25 October 1973, between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria. The majority of combat between the two sides took place in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights—both of which were occupied by Israel in 1967—with some fighting in African Egypt and northern Israel. Egypt’s initial objective in the war was to seize a foothold on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and subsequently leverage these gains to negotiate the return of the rest of the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula.
Between 10 and 13 October, both sides refrained from any large-scale actions, and the situation was relatively stable. Both sides launched small-scale attacks, and the Egyptians used helicopters to land commandos behind Israeli lines. Some Egyptian helicopters were shot down, and those commando forces that managed to land were quickly destroyed by Israeli troops. In one key engagement on 13 October, a particularly large Egyptian incursion was stopped and close to a hundred Egyptian commandos were killed.
On October 12, newly appointed Secretary of State Henry Kissinger held a news conference to assess the situation and what the U.S. was planning on which course to take to settle the conflict:
“I thought it might focus our discussion if I began by giving you a brief summary of the situation in the Middle East as we see it.
You ladies and gentlemen will understand that we are, at this moment, in a delicate phase in which our principal objective has to be to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and to lay the basis for a more permanent peace in the Middle East, and that. therefore, I will have to be somewhat guarded in some of the observations I make and in some of the answers I give to your questions. But I expect after the conclusion of this phase to have another press conference in which I will give a fuller account than may be possible today.
Now, let me talk about the situation in the Middle East in the following parts: First, the outbreak of hostilities. Secondly, the American efforts, after hostilities started, to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Third, a very brief observation on the military situation as we see it today. And, finally, where we hope to go from here.
First, with respect to what we knew prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the U.S. was aware that there were additional concentrations of Syrian forces and also that the Egyptian forces were engaged in what was interpreted both by our intelligence as well as by Israeli intelligence as their regular fall manoeuvres.
We asked our own intelligence, as well as Israeli intelligence, on three separate occasions during the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities, to give us their assessment of what might happen. There was the unanimous view that hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of it happening. Nor was the possibility of hostilities raised in any of the discussions with either of the parties that took place at the United Nations during the last week.
In these circumstances, the U.S. had no occasion to warn any country against engaging in pre-emptive action. The U.S., therefore, in the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities, gave no advice with respect to a contingency that we had been unanimously assured was not likely to happen – in fact was certain not to happen.
The first time the U.S. Government was informed that hostilities might be imminent was at six o’clock Saturday morning, when I was awakened and immediately contacted the President. From then until the time that we were informed that hostilities had, in fact, begun – which was around nine o’clock on Saturday morning – we did make intensive efforts with the parties, as well as with the Soviet Union and the Secretary General of the U.N., to attempt to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.
Obviously, given the scale of preparation that must have been made prior to the outbreak of hostilities, these efforts were unavailing.
After hostilities broke out, the U.S. set itself two principal objectives. One, to end the hostilities as quickly as possible. Secondly, to end the hostilities in such a manner that they would contribute to the maximum extent possible to the promotion of a more permanent, more lasting solution in the Middle East.
Therefore, the U.S. has sought during this period – first in the U.N., and, secondly, through a series of bilateral contacts – to create a framework in which both of these objectives could be realized. We have explored the possibilities of crystallizing a consensus within the U.N. We have also been in touch with the parties, as well as with the permanent members of the Security Council, in order to see what bilateral efforts might bring.”
Here is the complete News Conference as it was given on October 12, 1973.
